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Montana v. Wyoming, 131 S. Ct. 1765 (2011).
Ben Sudduth
I. INTRODUCTION
In Montana v. Wyoming,230 Montana alleged that Wyoming violated the Yellowstone
River Compact (Compact) by allowing its pre-1950 water users to increase irrigation efficiency
by switching from flood irrigation to sprinklers.231 The Compact is an agreement between the
states of Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota that allocates water from the Yellowstone River
System.232 The only issue under review was whether the Compact allows Wyoming‘s water
users to increase consumption of water by improving irrigation systems even if it ultimately
reduces the water returned to the rivers and reduces the flow of water for Montana users.233 The
United States Supreme Court held that the appropriation doctrine in Montana and Wyoming,
which was incorporated into the Compact, permitted a switch to more efficient irrigation.234
Montana also asserted that even if the doctrine of appropriation did not support its
position, the Compact‘s definition of ―beneficial use‖ restricted the scope of pre-1950 rights to
the volume of water Wyoming used to irrigate in 1950.235 Again, the Court struck down
Montana‘s argument, stating that the plain reading of the Compact‘s definition of ―beneficial
use‖ did not support Montana‘s position.236
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ratified in the 1951, Article V(A) of the Compact states that ―[a]ppropriative rights to the
beneficial uses of water . . . existing in each signatory State as of January 1, 1950, shall continue
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to be enjoyed in accordance with the laws governing the acquisition and use of water under the
doctrine of appropriation.‖237
Montana alleged that Wyoming violated the Compact by appropriating water from the
Tongue and Powder Rivers for ―a number new, post-1950 uses‖; the Compact, Montana argued,
did not allow these new uses as long as Montana‘s pre-1950 users‘ rights remained unfulfilled.238
Montana believed its appropriative rights to the Tongue and Powder Rivers were not
―continu[ing] to be enjoyed‖ because Wyoming‘s pre-1950 users increased consumption when
they switched from flood to sprinkler irrigation.239 Furthermore, Montana claimed the increased
consumption of water, and decreased seepage returning to the Tongue and Powder Rivers,
reduced the volume of water that flowed to Montana by 25% or more.240
After Wyoming filed a motion to dismiss Montana‘s complaint, the Court appointed a
Special Master to consider Wyoming‘s motion.241 The Special Master recommended that the
Court deny Wyoming‘s motion because some of Montana‘s allegations stated a claim for relief;
however, the Special Master agreed with Wyoming that Montana‘s allegations regarding the
―efficiency improvements‖ did not state a claim for relief.242 Montana, upon the Special
Master‘s rejection of the efficiency improvement argument, filed an exception.243 The main
issue before the Court was ―whether Article V(A) allow[ed] Wyoming‘s pre-1950 water users . .
. to increase their consumption of water by improving their irrigation systems even if it reduces
the flow of water to Montana‘s pre-1950 users.‖244
III. ANALYSIS
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Montana asserted two arguments against Special Master‘s ruling. First, the background
principles of appropriation law, which govern the Article V(A) of the Compact, bar such an
increase in consumption.245 Second, if appropriation law did allow such an increase in
consumption, the terms of the Compact still favored Montana.246
A. The Appropriation Doctrine
The appropriation doctrine states that ―rights to water are perfected and enforced in order
of seniority, starting with the first person to divert water from a natural stream and apply it to a
beneficial use.‖247 Beneficial use restricts a user ―to the amount of water that is necessary to
irrigate his land by making a reasonable use of the water.‖248 The perfection of such a right is
senior to any subsequent appropriators‘ rights and may be fully filled before junior appropriators
get any water.249 Even though the Compact assigned all pre-1950 users in Montana and
Wyoming the same seniority, the Court likened Montana water users to junior appropriators.250
Because of this equal right, Montana‘s pre-1950 users could not stop Wyoming‘s pre-1950 users
from fully exercising their water rights.251 Therefore, Montana could merely insist that
Wyoming users confine themselves strictly according to the Compact, that is, to the extent that
appropriations of water are actually applied to a beneficial use.252 Regarding the doctrine of
appropriation as incorporated into Article V(A) of the Compact, Montana asserted that Wyoming
violated the no injury rule and the doctrine of recapture.
1. No-Injury Rule
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Under the no-injury rule, junior appropriators may inhibit senior appropriators from
enlarging their appropriations to the junior‘s detriment.253 The no-injury rule states that if a
senior appropriator interferes with a junior appropriator‘s water right, then the junior
appropriator may complain.254
However, the no-injury rule was not absolute and was generally considered when there
were changes in the ―diversion location and the place or purpose of use.‖255 For example,
appropriators could increase their consumption by switching to more water-intensive crops, as
long as the acreage irrigated and the amount of water diverted stayed the same.256 Ordinary
operations, changes, and day-to-day repairs did not violate the no-injury rule.257
Here, the Court determined Wyoming‘s improvements to irrigation systems fell outside
of the no-injury rule because those changes did not influence the place of a diversion or the place
or purpose of use.258 The Court used statutes from Montana and Wyoming as dispositive proof
that the states did not require users to ―take official action‖ before adjusting irrigation methods;
from this, the Court concluded that Montana and Wyoming considered such changes to irrigation
permissible.259 In both Montana and Wyoming, litigation of the no-injury rule focused on
diversion changes rather than irrigation methods, strongly implying that improvements in
irrigation efficiency are not violations of the no-injury rule.260
2. Doctrine of Recapture
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Under the doctrine of recapture, an appropriator has the right to recapture water that is
within his right and reuse it on his land before it flows out of his control or off of his property.261
Appropriators have strong claims to ―waste‖ water: an appropriator has exclusive control of his
appropriated water, including incidental waste water from his irrigation, so long as he applies it
to a beneficial use.262
However, Montana argued that if this waste water, when not recaptured, returned to the
same stream that it was originally diverted, the doctrine of recapture did not apply.263 The Court
acknowledged support for Montana‘s position; case law from Colorado and Utah stated that a
beneficial user may not reuse the water if it would otherwise return to the same stream from
which it originated.264

However, case law from Montana and Wyoming supported the

original appropriator‘s recapture of water if it remained on his property and was reused for the
same purpose.265 The Court demonstrated the application of this principle with three cases from
the Supreme Court of Wyoming.266 The Court found similar conclusions from the same three
cases: Wyoming appropriators can increase their water use efficiency by recovering incidental
waste water on their property as long as the increased consumption was on the same land the
appropriative right was attached.267 In 1933, the Montana Supreme Court outlined a similar rule
where ―the owner of the right to use the water—his private property while in his possession,—
may collect it, recapture it, before it leaves his possession.‖268
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The Court concluded that Montana and Wyoming‘s treatment of the doctrine of recapture
supported Wyoming‘s position that improvements in irrigation efficiency were within its pre1950 appropriative rights.269 The Court compared the use of sprinklers to ―cruder recapture
systems involving ditches or pits‖; sprinklers reduce runoff because they efficiently deliver the
appropriated water, reduce runoff, and ―recapture‖ the water.270 Thus, Montana appropriators
are at the mercy of appropriators from Wyoming who choose to recapture irrigation water that
would otherwise return to the Tongue and Powder Rivers.271
B. Scope of Ordinary Appropriative Rights
Montana argued in the alternative that Article V(A) did not protect ―the full scope of
appropriative rights.‖272 Instead, Montana asserted that the definition of ―beneficial use‖
restricted ―the scope of pre-1950 appropriative rights to the net volume of water that was actually
being consumed in 1950.‖273 The Court believed this argument also fell short.274
The Court focused on plain reading of ―beneficial use.‖ To the Court, beneficial use
referred to the type of the irrigation use that depletes a water supply, not the amount.275 The
definition of ―beneficial use‖ clearly stated that the term depletion refers to ―that use by which
the water supply of a drainage basin is depleted.‖276
Montana‘s proposed definition of beneficial use would have changed the longstanding
meaning of the Compact‘s term; water put to ―beneficial use‖ had never been defined in terms of
net water consumption.277 The Court explained that if the Compact were meant to be read so that
Montana‘s definition was a set amount of water per year, then the Compact could have explicitly
269
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stated so.278 To the Court, the definition of beneficial use was unequivocal, and Article V(A) did
not alter the scope of the pre-1950 appropriative rights that it maintained in Montana and
Wyoming.279
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court concluded that the doctrine of appropriation, as it was incorporated into the
Yellowstone River Compact, supported the improvement of Wyoming‘s irrigation systems.
Furthermore, the Court also concluded that the scope of ordinary appropriative rights in Article
V(A) was not violated when Wyoming‘s appropriators increased water consumption. Therefore,
Wyoming appropriators were justified in improving their irrigation efficiency.
The Court was hesitant to issue a ruling on principles of the appropriation doctrine that
relied almost entirely on state law; the Court did not want to rule on issues almost entirely
between states.280 The decision of the Court reflected the general principles of the appropriation
doctrine in Montana and Wyoming holding that the appropriation doctrine of both states allows
an upstream user to improve their irrigation efficiency, even if downstream user‘s water
appropriations are impaired. The Court was unwilling to comment and further develop water
regulation between Montana and Wyoming beyond what these states had intended in the
Compact. The Court believes that job is for the highest courts of these states.281
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